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ESSAY
THE UNITED STATES' APPROACH TO
INTERNATIONAL CIVIL LITIGATION: RECENT
DEVELOPMENTS IN FORUM SELECTION
STEPHEN B. BURBANK*
1. INTRODUCTION
In a review essay published seven years ago,1 I engaged the ar-
gument made by Gary Born that international civil litigation was,
or was about to be, a discrete field in the United States. 2 While
praising Born's book, I argued that international civil litigation is
not a field, at least not of a "functional kind," one which seeks "to
* David Berger Professor for the Administration of Justice, University of
Pennsylvania. This Essay is based on a lecture given to the Penn Law European
Society in Milan, Italy, in May 1997, and to the German American Law Asso-
ciation in Frankfurt, Germany, in December 1997. Daniel J. Dorward, class of
1998, provided valuable research assistance.
1 See Stephen B. Burbank, The World in Our Courts, 89 MICH. L. REV. 1456
(1991).
2 See GARY B. BORN & DAVID WESTIN, INTERNATIONAL CIVIL
LITIGATION IN UNITED STATES COURTS: COMMENTARY AND MATERIALS 1-3
1989). Mr. Born is a distinguished graduate of the University of Pennsylvania
aw School, class of 1981.
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realize some underlying kind of justice." 3 Rather, I suggested, it is
better viewed "as part of a process of cross-fertilization in which
(1) doctrine and techniques developed in the context of domestic
cases are brought to bear on problems presented in international
litigation, and (2) the increasingly international dimensions of liti-
gation in our courts prompt changes in doctrine and techniques,
which are then applied in domestic cases."
4
In the same essay, I also explored the normative question
whether there should be a discrete field of international civil liti-
gation.5 I suggested that the answer might depend on the role that
international law can and should usefully play. I concluded that
"one form of international law, custom, has only a limited role to
play"6 and that, although there is normatively a much greater role
for treaties, even here the potential had not been realized, and the
reason had to do with power issues that were not unique to inter-
national litigation.
7
Forum selection occupies a great deal of the attention and en-
ergy of international practitioners, prior to and in response to the
initiation of a lawsuit. Recent developments in the United States'
approach to forum selection provide a welcome opportunity to
pursue further both the positive and the normative questions re-
garding international civil litigation as a field. I shall discuss three
aspects of forum selection: service of process under the Hague
Service Convention,8 personal jurisdiction under Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 4(k)(2), and lis alibi pendens. My focus in discuss-
ing each will be fairly narrow, but as to each I shall make connec-
tions with these more general questions.
2. SERVICE OF PROCESS UNDER THE HAGUE CONVENTION
The Hague Service Convention was the first treaty on matters
of private international law to which the United States became a
party. For most of U.S. history, isolationism and the supposed
Michael S. Moore, A Theory of Criminal Law Theories, in 10 TEL Aviv
UNIV. STUDIES IN LAW 115, 131 (Daniel Friedmann ed., 1991).
4 Burbank, supra note 1, at 1459.
5 See id. at 1473-97.
6 Id. at 1474.
7 See.id
Convention on the Service Abroad of Judicial and Extrajudicial Docu-
ments in Civil or Commercial Matters, approved Oct. 28, 1964, art. 2, 20 U.S.T.
361, 658 U.N.T.S. 163 [hereinafter Hague Service Convention].
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requirements of federalism prevented active cooperation in inter-
national lawmaking as to such matters, with the result that the
United States joined the Hague Conference on Private Interna-
tional Law only in 1964.
9
As it turned out, that was just in time for this country to par-
ticipate in the later stages of the formulation of the Hague Service
Convention, the initial draft of which had been prepared before
the United States joined the organization. I mention that fact be-
cause, if one were to read only the record of domestic delibera-
tions concerning the Hague Service Convention, one would think
that it represented a triumph of U.S. initiative and ideas.'0 In fact,
a comparison of the draft convention and the final product reveals
that the United States made only minor contributions."
The contrary story that was told to the United States Senate
and to the public was, I believe, part of a rhetorical strategy de-
signed to play to the traditional American belief that the way we
do things is the best way to do things-a belief that is as much the
product of ignorance as it is of chauvinism. In addition, the story
was that, as a result of our success at the Hague, the Convention
required very little change in domestic-although it would have
profound effect on many other countries'-practice. Against the
backdrop of a long history of isolationism and concern for the
supposed prerogatives of the states of the United States, propo-
nents of international involvement thought it best to represent
participation in international lawmaking as costless.'
2
Even if understandable at the time and for the purposes for
which it was initially deployed, this rhetorical strategy has con-
tinued to have effects, with the result that the United States has
been what I have called a "reluctant partner" 13 in making proce-
dural law for international civil litigation. In connection with
service of process, the effects of the attitudes that the strategy ex-
presses have been felt both in cases interpreting the Hague Service
9 See Stephen B. Burbank, The Reluctant Partner: Making Procedural Law for
International Civil Litigation, 57 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 103, 103-04 (1994).
10 See, e.g., S. Exec. Doc. C, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 20 (1967) (report of the
U.S. Delegation).
See Burbank, supra note 9, at 129-31.
12 See id. at 129-31, 136-37.
13 Id.
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Convention and in fashioning amendments to the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure. I propose briefly to discuss the former.
4
In the Schlunk case,15 the Supreme Court of the United States
held that, although the Hague Service Convention is mandatory
when there is occasion to transmit a judicial document for service
abroad in another signatory state, the internal law of the forum
(state or federal) alone determines whether in fact the applicable
method of serving process requires transmittal of documents
abroad in order to be effective.
Rejecting the view of three concurring Justices that the
Convention itself imposes a check on internal forum law,
the Court expressed doubt "that this country, or any other
country, w[ould] draft its internal laws deliberately so as
to circumvent the Convention in cases in which it would
be appropriate to transmit judicial documents for service
abroad." The Court also found comfort in due process
protection of foreign nationals and noted practical consid-
erations that are likely to prompt resort to the Conven-
tion even when it is not mandatory.
6
I have criticized the Schlunk decision, its premises and reason-
ing, on numerous grounds.17 My primary concern has been the
Court's failure to accord the Service Convention, which is su-
preme law under our Constitution, 8 the respect due even an or-
dinary federal statute by failing to engage the policies animating it
and to consider the interpretative rules they might reasonably be
thought to require. This failure, which also characterized the
Court's Aerosgatiale decision,' interpreting the Hague Evidence
Convention,2 bespeaks unwillingness to upset the uniformity of
14 For a discussion of the effects of such attitudes on amendments to the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, see id. at 111-24, 152.
15 Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft v. Schlunk, 486 U.S. 694 (1988).
16 Burbank, supra note 1, at 1478 (footnotes omitted) (quotingSchlunk, 486
U.S. at 705).
17 See id. at 1478-80; Burbank, supra note 9, at 131.
" U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
19 Societe Nationale Industrielle Aerospatiale v. United States Dist. Court,
482 U.S. 522 (1987).
20 Convention on the Taking of Evidence Abroad in Civil or Commercial
Matters, adopted Oct. 26, 1968, art. 2, 23 U.S.T. 2555, 847 U.N.T.S. 231.
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domestic law in the interest of international uniformity. It bodes
ill for effective participation by the United States in the process of
international lawmaking.21
It was thus a source of pleasure and relief to read two recent
trial court opinions holding that compliance with the Hague Serv-
ice Convention was required even though the relevant state law
provided for service on an agent within the state.22 In both cases
the state statutes by which the federal courts measured the effec-
tiveness of service permitted in-state service on an agent of the de-
fendant, as in Schlunk.2 Both also required, however, that copies
of the service papers be mailed to the defendant, which in these
cases, meant mailed abroad.
In one of these cases, Kim v. Frank Mohn A/S,24 the plaintiff
served the defendant's wholly owned Texas subsidiary and mailed
a copy directly to the defendant in Norway, as required by the
Texas long-arm statute. Relying on Texas decisions holding that
failure to mail a copy of the process to the nonresident defendant
deprived the court of jurisdiction, the federal court concluded that
the required notice was an integral part of service and that there-
fore the Hague Service Convention applied.2' The court did not
proceed to inquire whether mailing a copy of the process consti-
tuted compliance. 26 Had it done so, it would have discovered that
Norway has objected to the use of the mails under Article 10(a) of
the Convention.
Kim was a case in which state law alone prevented evasion of
the Service Convention by the technique that was approved in
Schlunk. A more recent case from Delaware suggests that the Su-
preme Court's decision may have even more limited practical im-
portance as a matter of treaty law. If so, it is because a limitation
upon which the Court placed some emphasis in attempting to al-
21 See Burbank, supra note 9, at 131.
22 See Kim v. Frank Mohn A/S, 909 F. Supp. 474 (S.D. Tex. 1995); Quinn
v. Keinicke, 700 A.2d 147 (Del. Super. Ct. 1996.
23 See Schlunk, 486 U.S. at 706.
24 909 F. Supp. 474 (S.D. Tex. 1995).
5 See id at 479.
26 The court ordered the plaintiff, within sixty days, "to forward a proper
letter of request for service to the proper Norwegian authority, in accordance
with the requirements of the Hague Convention." Id. at 480.
27 See GARY B. BORN, INTERNATIONAL CIVIL LITIGATION IN UNITED
STATES COURTS 811 (3d ed. 1996).
U. Pa. J Int'l Econ. L.
lay concern about its holding-due process of law2 -plays more
roles in the analysis than the Court may have contemplated.
Quinn v. Keinicke29 involved a lawsuit against a defendant re-
siding in Denmark as a result of an automobile accident in Dela-
ware. Delaware law required the plaintiff to serve process on the
Delaware Secretary of State and also to send a copy by registered
mail to the nonresident defendant. In ruling on the defendant's
motion to dismiss for insufficiency of service, the Delaware Supe-
rior Court held that the Hague Service Convention was applica-
ble because notice had to be transmitted abroad for service to be
complete.
30
For these purposes, what is interesting about Quinn is not its
interpretation of Delaware state law, but rather its reasoning that
transmittal abroad was also required by the due process clause. In
essence, the court recognized that due process is the law of every
forum in the United States, with the result that when due process
requires transmittal of notice abroad, compliance with the Service
Convention is mandatory.
31
Although the Delaware court in Quinn apparently thought
that it was merely following the Supreme Court of the United
States in this aspect,32 there may be less in the Court's opinion
than met its eye. For in Schlunk the Court saw a role for due
process primarily and perhaps only as the last defense of a foreign
national when service is made according to state law but the no-
tice provided is constitutionally inadequate. 33  Under the ap-
proach taken in Quinn, service may prove ineffective even when
constitutionally adequate notice has been given, because the due
process element in the analysis triggers the additional require-
ments of the Hague Service Convention.
2 See Schlunk, 486 U.S. at 705-06; supra text accompanying note 16.
29 700 A.2d 147 (Del. Super. Ct. 1996).
3 See id. at 154.
31 See id.
32 See id.
33 See Schlunk, 486 U.S. at 705-06. There is language in the Court's opinion
that may indicate awareness of a greater role for due process than that was re-
lied on in Quinn, see 700 A.2d at 154:
Where service on a domestic agent is valid and complete under both
state law and the Due Process Clause, our inquiry ends and the Con-
vention has no further implications.
Schlunk, 486 U.S. at 707.
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Even though the Quinn court may have misread Schlunk, I
applaud its reasoning, both because it represents a more coherent
view of the nature of internal forum law, particularly for interna-
tional purposes, 34 and because, if followed by other courts, it
would bring the United States closer to a defensible position in
connection with the Hague Service Convention. 5 Closer, but we
would still not be there yet. Even those who sold the Service
Convention to the United States Senate recognized, although they
had difficulty admitting, that the Convention itself would require
some changes in domestic law.36 One of the situations they had
in mind was suits under nonresident motorist statutes, like that in
Quinn, but where service on the Secretary of State alone sufficed
for effective service under domestic law:37  the American version
31 "In respect of all international negotiations and compacts, and in respect
of our foreign relations generally, state lines disappear." United States v. Bel-
mont, 301 U.S. 324, 331 (1937);cf Stephen B. Burbank, Federal Judgments Law:
Sources of Authorit and Sources of Rules, 70 TEX. L. REV. 1551, 1575 (1992)
(noting difficulties faced by courts in other countries when asked to determine
whether reciprocity requirement for recognition of judgments is met"based on
case law from one of fifty-one lawmangjurisdictions" n the United States).
s For concerns of other signatory states about the Supreme Court's inter-pretation of the Hague Service Convention in Schlunk, see Hage Conference
on Private International Law: Special Commission Report on the Operation of
the Hague Service Convention and the Hague Evidence Convention, 28 I.L.M.
1556, 1560-61 (1989); Peter H. Pfund, United States Participation in Transna-
tional Lawmaking, in LEX MERCATORIA AND ARBITRATION 167, 176 (Thomas
E. Carbonneau ed., 1990).
36 See Burbank, supra note 9, at 130-31.
37 Article 16 makes no substantial change in our present discretionary
equitable practice but Article 15, when a defendant is in a foreign
country, may make a minor change in the practice of some of our
States in long-arm and automobile accident cases.
If, in a particular state, service on the appropriate official need be ac-
companied only by a minimum effort to notif the defendant and if a
default judgment may be entered in as short a period as 30 or 60 days,
the convention will require greater protection of the defendant who lives
outside the United States in a convention country. A greater effort must
be made to serve such a defendant and the time for the entry of the de-
fault judgment may be delayed until the expiration of the 6 months'
minimum period in article 15.
S. EXEC. REP. No. 6, 90th Cong., 1st. Sess. 15 (1967) (statement of Philip W.
Amram) (emphasis added). See S. EXEG. DOG., supra note 10, at 6 (letter of
submittal).
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of notification au parquet. 38
Finally in connection with service, another aspect of Quinn is
worthy of note. There is a well-known split, which might more
accurately be described as a chasm, concerning the proper inter-
pretation of Article 10(a) of the Service Convention. That pro-
vision specifies that, so long as the state of destination does not
object, "the convention shall not interfere with.., the freedom to
send judicial documents, by postal channels, directly to persons
abroad."40  Some United States courts have held that, in the ab-
sence of a reservation, Article 10(a) is authority for service by
mail;4i others, relying in part on the use of the word "send" rather
than "serve," have held that it does not treat of service.
42
In Quinn, the Delaware court, having held that the Service
Convention applied, went on to conclude that there was compli-
ance with Article 10(a), to which Denmark has not objected. The
court reasoned that, even if Article 10(a) did not authorize service
by mail, it reached the case before the court, in which service was
made on the Delaware Secretary of State but documents were re-
quired to be sent abroad for that service to be effective.
43
3. PERSONAL JURISDICTION UNDER FEDERAL RULE OF CIVIL
PROCEDURE 4(K)(2)
Among the arguments made by those who sought to persuade
United States lawmakers to take a more sanguine view of partici-
pation in international lawmaking was that federalism concerns
had long prevented effective procedural reform in the federal
38 Notification au parquet permits service of process on a foreign defen-
dant by the deposit of documents with a designated local official. Al-
though the official generally is supposed to transmit the documents
abroad to the defendant, the statute of limitations begins to run from
the time the official receives the documents, and there is allegedly no
sanction for failure to transmit them.
Schlunk, 486 U.S. at 703.
39 See, e.g., BORN, supra note 27, at 811; Burbank, supra note 1, at 1486-87.
40 Hague Service Convention, supra note 8, art. 10(a), 20 U.S.T. at 363, 658
U.N.T.S. at 169.
41 See, e.g., Ackermann v. Levine, 788 F.2d 830, 839-40 (2d Cir. 1986).
42 See, e.g., Bankston v. Toyota Motor Corp., 889 F.2d 172 (8th Cir. 1989).
41 See Quinn, 700 A.2d at 155-56.
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courts but that these concerns had been overcome in 1938 when
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure became effective."
It has taken many more years for the Federal Rules themselves
to reflect the reality that international civil litigation requires spe-
cial attention, and not all of that attention has been as sympa-
thetic to international goals as it has been to domestic goals.
45
One of the recent amendments to the Federal Rules46 is likely to
be neglected because it is not explicitly targeted at international
litigation, although that is necessarily where it will have impact.
Until 1993, the answer to the question whether a federal court
could exercise personal jurisdiction over a defendant, domestic or
international, turned in most cases on the law of the state in
which the federal court sat, as limited by the Due Process Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment. That is not because the federal
government lacked the power to assert jurisdiction more expan-
sively. Indeed, a few federal statutes, at least as interpreted, do
so.47 Where there was no federal statute speaking to the question,
however, the federal courts concluded that they were remitted to
Rule 4 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and by that rule in
most cases to the jurisdictional arrangements governing in the
state in which they sat.48
This was manifestly unsatisfactory in situations in which the
federal government, and hence the federal courts, had the poten-
tial to resolve disputes not capable of resolution in any state. As
the Supreme Court recognized in Omni Capital, one such situa-
tion involved federal law claims against alien defendants who
lacked the necessary affiliating circumstances with any individual
state but who could constitutionally be subjected to personal ju-
risdiction in federal court if there were authority in positive law.
49
In that case, as is typical, the federal statute did not address the
question of personal jurisdiction, and the Court declined to fash-
ion a judge-made amenability standard, even on the assumption
44 See Harry L. Jones, International Judicial Assistance: Procedural Chaos and
a Programfor Reform, 62 YALE L.J. 515, 562 (1953).
46 See Burbank, supra note 9, at 111-24.
46 See FED. R. CIV. P. 4(k)(2).
4 See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. S 22 (1994); Go-Video, Inc. v. Akai Elec. Co., 885
F.2d 1406 (9th Cir. 1989).
48 See, e.g., Omni Capital Int'l v. Rudolf Wolff & Co., 484 U.S. 97, 104-08
(1987).
41 Id. at 111.
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that it had the power to do so. The Court went out of its way,
however, to suggest that the problem might be solved through
court rulemaking under the Rules Enabling Act. 0
Those responsible for proposing amendments to the Federal
Rules initially responded to the Court's invitation with an ambi-
tious provision that would have authorized a federal court to as-
sert personal jurisdiction to the limits of Fifth Amendment due
process in any case involving a federal claim. Critics, including
this one, argued that, invitation or no, and however desirable as a
policy matter, such a rule was beyond the Supreme Court's power
under the Enabling Act.51  Chastened, the rulemakers dramati-
cally scaled back the proposal and took the extraordinary step of
warning the Court and Congress that there was a question about
the validity of even the scaled back version.
52
Rule 4(k)(2), effective at the end of 1993, provides that "[i]f the
exercise of jurisdiction is consistent with the Constitution and
laws of the United States, serving a summons... is... effective,
with respect to claims arising under federal law, to establish per-
sonal jurisdiction over the person of any defendant who is not
subject to the jurisdiction of the courts of general jurisdiction of
any state."
53
It is risky business to paint a picture of a litigation landscape
in the United States with only the view afforded by published
opinions, since, in area after area, study of decisions published and
unpublished reveals that such a picture is likely to be distorted.
5 4
Still, even acknowledging that Rule 4(k)(2) has been in effect for
only four years, it is striking what little light has been shed on it
by the courts. There are less than ten opinions of courts of ap-
peals, and approximately fifty of district courts, that even men-
tion the Rule, and few of those opinions treat disputed issues.
One of the most important questions presented by Rule
4(k)(2) concerns the proper amenability standard under the Due• 55
Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. Prior to 1993, in cases
50 See id. at 108-11.
51 See Burbank, supra note 1, at 1484 n.164.
52 See id.; Burbank, supra note 9, at 146 n.347.
53 FED. R. Civ. P. 4(k)(2).
54 See, e.g., RULE 11 IN TRANSITION: THE REPORT OF THE THIRD CIRCUIT
TASK FORCE ON FEDERAL RULE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 11, at 59 (Stephen B.
Burbank, reporter, 1989).
55 The Advisory Committee was agnostic on this question, noting that the
"Fifth Amendment requires that any aefendant have affiliating contacts with
[Vol 19:1
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where federal courts believed that they were authorized to apply a
distinctively federal amenability standard under the Fifth
Amendment, some of them inquired only into a defendant's con-
tacts with the United States,5 6 while others asked the additional
question whether, even if there were minimum contacts, an exer-
cise of jurisdiction would be reasonable, taking account of such
matters as the interests of the plaintiff, of the forum, and of the
interstate or international system.
5 7
Since the Supreme Court's decision in the Asahi case,58 it has
been clear that jurisdictional analysis under the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment requires consideration of
both minimum contacts and reasonableness. It is inconceivable to
me that, having struggled so long and hard to work out the rela-
tionship between power and reasonableness in that context,59 the
Court would hold that reasonableness is irrelevant under the
Fifth Amendment. It is particularly inconceivable that the Court
would do so in a case brought pursuant to Rule 4(k)(2), which
the United States," and suggesting that "[t]here also may be a further Fifth
Amendment constraint in that a plaintiff's forum selection might be so incon-
venient to a defendant that it would be a denial of 'fair play and substantial jus-
tice.'" FED. R. CIv. P. 4(k)(2) advisory committee's note. The Committee also
observed that the "availability of transfer for fairness and convenience under
1404 should preclude most conflicts between the full exercise of territorialju-
risdiction permitted by this rule and the Fifth Amendment requirement of fair
play and substantial justice.'" Id.
Another important question is whether Rule 4(k)(2) is limited to federal
question cases brought under 28 U.S.C. S 1331 or extends to any case involving
claims under federal law, no matter what the source of subject matter jurisdic-
tion. For a decision holding that the Rule is not limited, and thus extends to
maritime claims, see World Tankers Corp. v. M/V Ya Mawlaya, 99 F.3d 717 (5th
Cir. 1996).
56 See, e.g., Go-Video, Inc. v. Akai Elec. Co., 885 F.2d 1406 (9th Cir. 1989).
"Whether the forum within the United States is convenient to the defendant is
a question of venue and discretionary doctrines allowing transfers; it has noth-
ing to do with judicial power." United Rope Distrib., Inc. v. Seatriumph Ma-
rine Corp., 930 F.2d 532, 534 (7th Cir. 1991).
57 See, e.g., GRM v. Equine Inv. & Mgt. Group, 596 F. Supp. 307 (S.D. Tex.
1984). For a post-1993 decision taking this approach, see, for example, Republic
of Panama v. BCCI Holdings (Lux.) S.A., 119 F.3d 935, 947-48 (11th Cir. 1997).
For criticism of the analysis in this decision, based on the fact that the issue of
jurisdiction involved a domestic defendant, see Recent Case, 111 HARV. L. REV.
1359 (1998); see also infra text accompanying notes 69-78 (discussing tag jurisdic-
tl Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102 (1987).
59 See Burbank, supra note 1, at 1467-71.
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would necessarily be a case with international dimensions like
those in Asahi.
The Supreme Court has not yet interpreted Rule 4(k)(2), but
the lower courts have, by and large, reached what by my lights is
the correct result. A particularly interesting example is found in a
recent opinion of the United States District Court for the South-
ern District of New York in Aerogroup International, Inc. v. Marl-
boro Footworks, Ltd.0 In that case the judge granted the motions
to dismiss of two Canadian corporations after a probing analysis
of both their contacts with the United States and the reasonable-
ness of exercising jurisdiction.6'
Aerogroup is also interesting because of the court's treatment
of another important question raised by Rule 4(k)(2). Recall that
the Rule's authority to apply a federal amenability standard ap-
plies only with respect to a "defendant who is not subject to the
jurisdiction of the courts of general jurisdiction of any state." 62 It
has been observed that Rule 4(k)(2) may lead to some "anomalous
litigation positions,"63 including the argument of a defendant that
it is subject to state court jurisdiction, since if so it can avoid fed-
eral court jurisdiction under Rule 4(k)(2). In fact, the Rule raises
more questions than it answers,64 including questions concerning
the procedures to be employed in probing the existence of state
court jurisdiction.65
In Aerogroup, the plaintiff asserted that the court had jurisdic-
tion over the two, Canadian corporations under New York law
and, in the alternative, under Rule 4.(k)(2). Having found that
there was no jurisdiction under the New York long-arm statute,
and noting the requirements of Rule 4(k)(2), the court-seemingly
on its own motion-engaged in a detailed inquiry into jurisdiction
in Massachusetts, which it deemed the only other state with
which the Canadian corporations might have sufficient contacts
to justify exercising jurisdiction.
66
If, indeed, the court's inquiry into jurisdiction over the defen-
dants in Massachusetts was undertaken on its own motion, it was
60 956 F. Supp. 427 (S.D.N.Y. 1996).
61 See id. at 43842.
62 FED. R. Civ. P. 4(k)(2).
63 BORN, supra note 27, at 197.
64 See Burbank, supra note 1, at 1484 n.164.
65 See BORN, supra note 27, at 197.
66 See Aerogroup, 956 F. Supp. at 432-38.
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a self-inflicted wound. For purposes of personal, as opposed to
subject matter, jurisdiction,67 it cannot be the responsibility of the
court to conduct a blue sky investigation of the fifty states. It
would also make little sense to require the plaintiff initially to at-
tempt to negate jurisdiction in the fifty states.6 1 Rather, it would
seem sensible to require a defendant resisting jurisdiction under
Rule 4(k)(2) to assert that he is subject to jurisdiction in a specific
state and why. The burden would then shift, according to the ap-
plicable standard, to the plaintiff to negate jurisdiction in the
specified state(s).
Finally, another interesting question in connection with Rule
4(k)(2), which both Gary Born and I noted in comments on the
rule when first proposed,69 concerns the role, if any, that so-called
tag service plays in conferring jurisdiction under its provisions.
Regrettably and, in light of international developments, ironi-
cally,70 the Supreme Court blessed the constitutionality of per-
sonal jurisdiction asserted through in-state service in its 1990
Burnham decision. 1 The language of Rule 4(k)(2) would support
tag service within the United States.7 Yet, even though I have
argued that the Court should interpret the Due Process Clause of
the Fifth Amendment as it does the counterpart in the Fourteenth
67 Compare FED. R. CIV. P. 12(h)(3) ("Whenever it appears by suggestion of
the parties or otherwise that the court lacks jurisdiction of the subject matter,
the court shall dismiss the action") with Insurance Corp. of Ireland v. Compag-
nie des Bauxites de Guinee, 456 U.S. 694, 702 n.10 (1982) (waivability of per-
sonal jurisdiction requirement supports conclusion that due process does not
impose an independent federalism restriction on sovereign power of the court).
68 See BORN, supra note 27, at 197. But see CFMT Inc. v. Steag Microtech,
Inc., No. 95442-LON, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7905, at *24 n.10 (D. Del. Jan. 9,
1997) ("This Court interprets the directive of Rule 4(k)(2) to require that [sic]
the party opposing the motion to dismiss to affirmatively represent and demon-
strate that the defendant is not subject to the jurisdiction of any state, not solely
the state in which the district court is located.")
69 See Statement of Gary B. Born on Proposed Amendments to Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure Affecting International Litigation 8-11 (Feb. 2, 1990)
(on file with author); Letter from Stephen B. Burbank to Committee on Rules
of Practice and Procedure 3 (Mar. 14, 1990) (on file with author).
70 "There is irony in that a rule once justified in terms of principles of in-
ternational law 'is no longer acceptable under international law if [presence] is
the only basis for jurisdiction and the action in question is unrelated to that
state.'" Burbank, supra note 1, at 1468 n.66 (quoting RESTATEMENT (THIRD)
OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES S 421 reporters' note 5
(1987)).
7' Burnham v. Superior Court of Cal., 495 U.S. 604 (1990).
7 See supra text accompanying note 53.
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Amendment in other contexts,73 there may be a basis for a dis-
tinction here.
The linchpin of Justice Scalia's analysis in Burnham is history,
the "pedigree"74 of state court tag jurisdiction. The history of fed-
eral court tag jurisdiction is murky, if there is a history at all. Su-
preme Court decisions of which I am aware that may seem to
support federal court tag jurisdiction are at most dictum on that
question and can fairly be confined to the question of the territo-
rial limits of service. Moreover, should thequestion arise,7 6 the
breathtaking scope of the alien venue statute could test the no-
tion that reasonableness does not matter under Rule 4(k)(2).
I have not been able to find any decisions on this question.
The issue was raised, albeit in the exotic context of enforcement
jurisdiction concerning an administrative subpoena issued by the
Securities and Exchange Commission, in a recent case in the
Tenth Circuit. The court declined to reach it, however, conclud-
ing that the individual served with the subpoena "independently
ha[d] sufficient minimum contacts with the United States to sup-
port the district court's exercise of personal jurisdiction enforcing
the subpoenas."
78
4. LiS ALIBI PENDENS
The third and last aspect of forum selection to be discussed is
veiled in the decent obscurity of the Latin phrase lis alibi pendens,
which literally translated means lawsuit pending elsewhere. In
73 See supra text accompanying note 59.
74 Burnbam, 495 U.S. at 621 (plurality opinion). Note that no part of Jus-
tice Scalia's opinion commanded a majority of the Court. See id. at 606-07.
75 See Mississippi Pub. Corp. v. Murphree, 326 U.S. 438, 442 (1946); Rob-
ertson v. R.R. LaBor Bd., 268 U.S. 619, 622 (1925); United States v. Union Pa-
cific R.R., 98 U.S. 569, 603-04 (1879); Toland v. Sprague, 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 300,
328 (1838).
76 Given the peculiar inquiry called for by Rule 4(k)(2), making relevant
the defendant's amenability to jurisdiction in state court (where tag jurisdiction
is constitutionally permitted if authorized as a matter of state law), perhaps the
question could only arise if the case were not one that could be brought in state
court. See infra text accompanying note 78.
It should be noted in addition that, the constitutional question aside, Rule
4(k) 2) need not be interpreted to permit tag jurisdiction.
28 U.S.C. 5 1391(d) (1994) ("An alien may be sued in any district."). For
the role of transfer, see supra note 55.
78 Application to Enforce Admin. Subpoenas Duces Tecum of the SEC v.
Knowles, 87 F.3d 413, 416 n.5 (10th Cir. 1996).
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the parlance of U.S. law, the issue raised is whether and when one
court should stay or dismiss the action pending before it because
there is a duplicative or related action pending before another
court. It is, as Professor Andreas Lowenfeld recently observed, an
issue that arises with greater and greater frequency, as "[f]orum
shopping, which used to be a favorite indoor sport of interna-
tional lawyers, has developed into a fine art."79
Recall that I described international civil litigation not as a
field but as part of a process of "cross-fertilization." 0 That proc-
ess has its risks, and I suggest that some of those risks have been
realized in the formulation and application of standards for stay-
ing international litigation in U.S. courts. It appears that, at least
until recently, the federal courts followed some variant of two
quite different approaches to the question whether an American
court should stay or dismiss proceedings before it in deference to
litigation elsewhere.
8 1
One group of cases follows the model of duplicative or related
proceedings wholly within the federal court system, a model that
makes it quite easy to obtain a stay, particularly from the court
where the second action was filed. In the domestic context fur-
nishing the model, both courts are part of the same (federal) sys-
tem of courts, and differences between them can be settled by
higher authority (the United States Supreme Court). Neither is
true when it is proposed that a United States court stay its pro-
ceedings in favor of litigation abroad. This may suggest that, even
though the costs of rewarding victory in the race to the court-
house are not thought to be equal to those of duplicative proceed-
ings in the domestic context, the calculus should be different in
the international context.
The polar opposite approach has been taken in another group
of cases, which use as their model for international cases the deci-
sions of federal courts that have been asked to abstain in favor of
state court proceedings in the interest of "wise judicial administra-
79 Andreas F. Lowenfeld, Forum Shopping, Antisuit Injunctions, Negative
Declarations, and Related Tools of International Litigation, 91 AM. J. INT'L L.
314, 314 (1997).
80 Supra text accompanying note 4.
8! See BORN, supra note 27, at 462.
82 See, e.g., Continental Time Corp. v. Swiss Credit Bank, 543 F. Supp. 408
(S.D.N.Y. 1982) (following Landis v. North American Co., 299 U.S. 248
(1936)).
U. Pa. . Int'l Econ. L.
tion."s3 These cases, which apply the standards set forth by the
Supreme Court in its Colorado River decision,8 4 make it much
more difficult to obtain deference to foreign proceedings, since
their basic premise is that federal courts have a "virtually unflag-
ging obligation"85 to exercise the subject matter jurisdiction that
has been conferred by statute, with the result that they may de-
cline to do so only in "exceptional circumstances."
8 6
Fortunately, recent decisions of the Supreme Court seem to
clear up a good deal of the analytical and doctrinal confusion evi-
dent in the contrasting approaches taken in the international con-
text by clarifying the reach and limits of the domestic models on
which they are based.
First, in 1995, the Supreme Court made clear that a federal
court in which a litigant has sought a declaratory judgment in an-
ticipation of or reaction to a coercive action in state court should
consider the impact of the state proceedings as part of the discre-
tionary inquiry appropriate to the remedy sought rather than un-
der Colorado River.17 I assume that the same is true when the du-
plicative or related proceedings have been or would be
commenced in another country.
Second, perhaps reacting to powerful critiques of its domesticabstentioneacting
abstention decisions,88 and drawing further on its declaratory
judgment decisions, in 1996 the Supreme Court sought to ration-
alize prior cases in Quackenbush v. Allstate Insurance Co.89 There,
the Court drew a sharp distinction between a dismissal and a stay,
reasoning that the latter involved no failure or refusal to exercise
subject matter jurisdiction, while the former might, and that such
failure or refusal could be justified only in cases where the relief
sought was equitable or otherwise discretionary.
90
83 See, e.g., Ingersoll Milling Machine Co. v. Granger, 833 F.2d 680 (7th
Cir. 1987).
84 Colorado River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800
(1976).
85 Id. at 817.
86 Id. at 813.
87 See Wilton v. Seven Falls Co., 515 U.S. 277 (1995).
88 See, e.g., MARTIN H. REDISH, THE FEDERAL COURTS IN THE POLMCAL
ORDER 47-74 (1991). But see David Shapiro, Jurisdiction and Discretion, 60
N.Y.U. L. REV. 543 (1985).
89 116 S. Ct. 1712 (1996).
90 See id. at 1723.
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The Court's decision in Quackenbush was based on the notion
that a request for injunctive, declaratory, or other equitable relief
triggers the historical powers of a court of equity, which can be
used to justify, if they do not explain, a refusal to exercise jurisdic-
tion ending in dismissal.91 The Court was less successful in bring-
ing within the analytical fold post-1948 cases dismissing damages
actions on the ground of forum non conveniens, to which it under-
standably imputed a separate history.
92
As a result of Quackenbush, in a case in which the plaintiff
seeks only money damages, it would be improper for a federal
court to dismiss rather than to stay on a theory of deference other
than forum non conveniens, including abstention or lis alibi pen-
dens, no matter where the duplicative or related proceedings are
or may be lodged. A further result, I should think, would be to
cause those courts that have looked to Colorado River for guid-
ance in the international context to cease doing so. Those courts
would thus have the opportunity, which they should seize, to
consider analytical approaches that do not run to the opposite
pole by treating the courts of Italy as if they were federal courts in
another district.
5. CONCLUSION
Whether international civil litigation is now or should ever be
thought a discrete field of law,93 recent cases involving issues of
forum selection suggest ways in which the United States can be-
come a more discriminating, and hence a more effective, partici-
pant in the process of making law for international cases.
I have argued that the most troublesome aspect of the Su-
preme Court's decision in the Schlunk case94 was not its holding,
but rather the Court's approach to the interpretation of the
Hague Service Convention and the attitude towards the relation-
ship between domestic and international law that such an ap-
proach conveyed. 95 The recent district court decisions discussed
here not only suggest that Schlunk will cause only limited damage
91 See id. at 1721.
92 See id. at 1724.
93 See supra text accompanying notes 1-7. Mr. Born appears to have aban-
doned this claim in the most recent edition of his book. See BORN, supra note
27.
9' Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft v. Schlunk, 486 U.S. 694 (1988).
95 See supra text accompanying notes 15-21.
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from the perspective of those who disagree with its holding.
9 6
One of them evinces a more sympathetic attempt to reconcile
domestic and international law.
9
Just as the addition of Rule 4(k)(2) to the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure solved a problem existing under prior domestic
law,98 so from an international perspective did it furnish addi-
tional cause for concern about exorbitant assertions of personal
jurisdiction by United States courts. 99 Accordingly, it should be a
source of reassurance in the international arena that most lower
federal courts interpreting the new Rule have implemented the
Supreme Court's sensitivity to the burdens of international litiga-
tion by imputing constraints to the Fifth Amendment that are
similar to those the Court imputed to the Fourteenth. 00 Com-
plete consistency in that regard, as in the treatment of tag jurisdic-
tion, would be foolish,1' 1 however, because of differences in his-
torical circumstances, and because, as a result of the Supreme
Court's decision in the Burnham case,102 Fourteenth Amendment
limitations inadequately protect against the burdens of litigation,
domestic and international.' 3
Finally, we see in the recent history of us alibi pendens a cau-
tionary tale about borrowing solutions for problems in interna-
tional cases from domestic cases. It is possible, however, that the
problem arose as much from the incoherence of domestic models
as it did from their thoughtless transference.
96 See supra text accompanying notes 22-38.
97 See Quinn v. Keinicke, 700 A.2d 147 (Del. Super. Ct. 1996);supra text
accompanying notes 29-38.
98 See supra text accompanying note 49.
99 Thus, for instance, the standards for asserting personal jurisdiction used
by U.S. courts, particularly in product liability cases, proved a roadblock in ef-
forts to conclude a convention on the recognition of judgments with the
United Kingdom. See Peter M. North, The Drft UK/U.S. Judgments Conven-
tion:A British Viewpoint, 1 Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 219, 228-39 (1979).
100 See Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court of Cal., 480 U.S. 102
(1987); supra text accompanying notes 55-61.
10' "A foolish consistency is the hobgoblin of little minds, adored by little
statesmen and philosophers and divines." Ralph Waldo Emerson,Self-Reliance,
in ESSAYS & LECTURES 265 (Joel Porte ed., 1983).
102 Burnham v. Superior Court of Cal., 495 U.S. 604 (1990).
103 See supra text accompanying notes 69-78.
[Vol 19:1
1998] RECENTDEVELOPMENTS IN FORUM SELECTION 19
In any event, the recent progress made in rationalizing domes-
tic doctrine should make clearer than before differences in inter-
national cases that may call for different solutions.
10 4
104 See supra text accompanying notes 79-92.
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